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 Recent Turkish referendum (2017) and electoral votes (2018) have produced 
drastically different results from Turkish diasporas abroad – Germany and the United States 
especially. The results in Germany have caused German media sources and politicians to 
target integration as the main cause for its Turkish diaspora’s support of President Erdogan 
and the AKP. In order to address this apparent connection, this paper will conduct a 
comparative analysis between the German and US Turkish diasporas using two schools of 
voting behavior theory. Specifically, the analysis will consider both communities in regard to 
the sociological (class structure; education; geographic cleavages) and psychological (sense of 
belonging; citizenship) schools in order to explore potential connections to voting behavior 
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 Since 2012, Turkish citizens residing abroad have been able to participate in Turkish 
elections and referenda. The voting results of Turkish diasporas have been of great 
importance to Turkish election results. However, during the years immediately following this 
significant policy change, countries with large Turkish diasporas – European countries mainly 
– showed little concern for the voting behaviors of these communities. Voting results were of 
little importance when Turkey was still considered a democratic state and enjoyed positive 
relations with its western partners. As relations between Turkey and the West began to 
deteriorate over the course of the 2010s, spawned mainly by democratic backsliding and 
authoritarian power grabbing by the Erdogan administration, the importance of Turkish 
diasporas abroad increased accordingly. Nowhere was this development more salient than in 
Germany, which is home to the largest Turkish community outside of Turkey. German-
Turkish bilateral relations have worsened in large part due to President Erdogan’s efforts in 
targeting the German-Turkish vote. The efforts of the Erdogan administration in this respect 
have been awarded time and time again, albeit at the expense of Turkey’s relationship with its 
historic German partners. While domestic voting results have been relatively balanced, 
Germany’s Turks have shown overwhelming support for President Erdogan and the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP). The voting behavior of German Turks has prompted German 
politicians and media organizations to identify integration as the main cause for German-
Turkish support of President Erdogan and the AKP. However, one must consider the often 
sensationalized and reactionary context in which these diagnoses have been applied.  
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In order to assess these claims, this paper will – through corresponding voting behavior 
theories – conduct a comparative analysis between German and American Turks through a 
“most different approach.” The American case is of particular importance, as it represents the 
opposite spectrum of Turkish voting behavior abroad. While Germany’s Turks have 
overwhelmingly supported President Erdogan and the AKP, Turks residing in the United 
States voted against the 2017 Erdogan-backed referendum, and have predominantly voted for 
candidates representing the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the party of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. The goal of this paper is to explore connections between voting behavior theories 
and the – distinctively different – voting behaviors of German and American Turks in order to 
assess the claim that integration is the main cause of German-Turkish voting behavior.  
 First, this paper will provide an overview of the evolution of Turkish voting rights, 
results and reactions. This section serves to provide context to understand the evolution of the 
West’s opinion of the voting behaviors of its respective Turkish diasporas and the eventual 
reaction of politicians and the media – mainly following the 2017 Turkish Constitutional 
Referendum. Additionally, this paper will provide backgrounds on the German and 
American-Turkish communities. The purpose of these two sections is to provide, first and 
foremost, answers to a few – often-overlooked – questions: Who are these people? When and 
why did they emigrate from Turkey to Germany or the United States? What is the 
composition of these communities? Also, these backgrounds will provide context and 
valuable information, which this paper will then analyze within the structure of voting 
behavior theories in relation to sociology and psychology. After detailing the various theories 
utilized in this work, this paper will conduct a comparative analysis in order to shed light on 
the possible connections between integrational factors and voting patterns of Turks in the 





Turkish Voting Rights, Results, and Reactions 
 
In 2012, the Turkish Grand National Assembly altered the Turkish constitution by 
granting citizens residing abroad the right to vote in domestic elections and referenda.1 The 
change in legislation simplified the voting process for millions of Turks residing outside of 
the country, and consequently ushered in large levels of new voters. The change was of little 
consequence to countries with large Turkish diasporas in the first years following 2012. In the 
case of western Europe, although support for Erdogan and the AKP was high amongst Turks 
during the June and November 2015 elections, media coverage of these developments was 
minimal. 2/3 This could be a result of Turkey’s strained, but intact relationship with the 
European Union at this time. Reactions from the media and politicians related to foreign 
Turkish support for the Erdogan administration changed drastically after President Erdogan 
adopted a more authoritarian style of leadership. 
 After relations between Turkey and the West took a turn for the worst following the 
2016 failed coup attempt, subsequent elections began to increase in importance (in the eyes of 
the West).4 In January 2017, President Erdogan announced a referendum campaign to further 
alter the Turkish Constitution, essentially changing Turkey’s government from a 
                                                 
1 Erdem, Kasım and Mehmet Solak. “Grand National Assembly of Turkey.” December 2012. 
 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/yayinlar/yabanci_diller/TBMM_Ingilizce.pdf, 6. 
 
2 “June 2015 General Election Results.” Yeni Şafak. June 2015. Accessed April 17, 2019. 
https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-2015/secim-sonuclari. 
 
3 “November 2015 General Election Results.” Yeni Şafak. November 2015. Accessed April 17, 2019. 
https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-2015-kasim/secim-sonuclari.” 
 





parliamentary to a presidential system.5/6 Among the various changes to the Turkish political 
structure, some of the more controversial elements of the referendum included the power of 
the president to appoint ministers without approval, prepare the national budget, select new 
senior judges, enact laws by decree, declare a state of emergency unilaterally, and abolish the 
parliament.7 The referendum was lobbied extensively and aggressively by the Erdogan 
government. In addition to a large domestic campaign, President Erdogan and other 
prominent AKP politicians targeted large western European-Turkish diasporas, and placed a 
special emphasis on Germany. In the months preceding the vote, President Erdogan and 
members of his cabinet attempted to organize speeches to galvanize support. While it is not 
against the law for foreign officials to campaign in Germany, local governments began 
banning Turkish officials from holdings such events, citing security concerns. In response to 
this development, President Erdogan compared the actions of local German governments to 
tactics used by the Nazis, a description that received severe backlash from Germany and the 
international community.8  
 In March 2017, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu delivered a speech at the 
Turkish Consulate in Hamburg in which he castigated German authorities for interfering in 
domestic Turkish affairs. He described the efforts of the German government to disallow 
                                                 
5 Wintour, Patrick. “Erdoğan Stakes All on Winning Referendum as Diplomatic Row Simmers.” The Guardian. 
March 14, 2017. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/erdogan-turkey-
referendum-diplomatic-row. 
 
6 Klimek, Peter, Jimenez, Raul, Hidalgo, Manuel, Hinteregger, Abraham and Stefan Thurner. “Election forensic 
analysis of the Turkish Constitutional Referendum 2017.” July 4, 2017. https://arxiv-
org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/pdf/1706.09839.pdf. 
 
7 Klimek, Peter, Jimenez, Raul, Hidalgo, Manuel, Hinteregger, Abraham and Stefan Thurner. “Election forensic 
analysis of the Turkish Constitutional Referendum 2017.” July 4, 2017. https://arxiv-
org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/pdf/1706.09839.pdf. 
 





Turkish campaign efforts as anti-Islamic and reminiscent of Nazi Germany.9 The Erdogan 
administration’s campaign in Germany – and western Europe – focused on exposing 
perceived weaknesses in the relationship between Turkish communities and their respective 
states and societies. German efforts to ban Turkish officials from campaigning before the 
referendum vote in Germany played into the hands of President Erdogan. It was, in essence, a 
win-win situation. If an Erdogan official could deliver a speech in support of the referendum, 
President Erdogan would benefit. If the German government barred a Turkish official from 
delivering a speech, President Erdogan could point out the same weaknesses – or “systematic 
antagonism” as Foreign Minister Cavusoglu described10 – and benefit all the same. 
 In April 2017, the Turkish Constitutional Referendum passed with 51.4% of the total 
vote.11 While domestic voting results were relatively balanced, German and many western 
European Turks voted largely in favor of the constitutional change. In the case of Germany, 
63.1% of eligible, participatory German Turks voted “yes” in the referendum. In some cities, 
including Cologne, Düsseldorf and Essen, the “yes” vote reached as high as 75%.12 In almost 
every major German city, certain factions of the Turkish community held celebrations in the 
streets for the Erdogan victory.13 On the other hand, in the United States, nearly 84% of 
                                                 
9 “Turkey's Cavusoglu Accuses Germany of ‘systematic Antagonism’.” Deutsche Welle. March 7, 2017. 
Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-cavusoglu-accuses-germany-of-systematic-
antagonism/a-37841018. 
 
10 “Turkey's Cavusoglu Accuses Germany of ‘systematic Antagonism’.” Deutsche Welle. March 7, 2017. 
Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-cavusoglu-accuses-germany-of-systematic-
antagonism/a-37841018. 
 
11 “2017 Constitutional Referendum Results.” Yeni Şafak. April 2017. Accessed June 23, 2019.  
 https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-referandum-2017/secim-sonuclari. 
 
12 “2017 Constitutional Referendum Results: Germany.” Yeni Şafak. April 17, 20art17. Accessed June 9, 2019. 
https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-referandum-2017/yurtdisi-almanya-secim-sonuclari-referandum. 
 
13 Chambers, Madeline. "Pro-Erdogan Vote among Turks in Germany Unleashes Integration Row." Reuters. 





eligible Turks who participated, voted against the constitutional change – quite a difference to 
the German case.14   
 The voting results of Germany’s Turkish population and the subsequent celebrations 
of the historic referendum vote sparked a swift and severe reaction from the German media 
and political apparatus. Some German reporting at this time, in reference to the close margin 
by which the referendum passed, suggested that Germany’s Turks had tipped the balance in 
President Erdogan’s favor.15 Former Green Party Co-Chair Cem Özdemir, the son of Turkish 
immigrants, stated that “the election result shows that we have a long way to go in terms of 
integration” and that “[German Turks] must fully accept the values and constitution of our 
country if we want to be here in the long run.”16 Another Green Party parliamentarian with 
Turkish roots, Özcan Mutlu, stated that the referendum results in Germany proved Germany’s 
sub-standard integration efforts in the last decade.17 A senior SPD (Social Democratic Party) 
politician in the western federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), an area which 
recorded the highest support for the referendum, stated that, “the current situation is an 
incrimination of the integration process in Germany and NRW.”18  One opinion piece from 
                                                 




15 “Why Many Turks in Germany Voted 'yes' in Erdogan's Referendum.” Deutsche Welle. April 18, 2017. 
Accessed June 11, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/why-many-turks-in-germany-voted-yes-in-erdogans-
referendum/a-38472130. 
 
16 Huggler, Justin. “Senior German Politicians Call for Changes to Dual Citizenship Laws after German Turks 
Vote to Increase Erdogan's Powers.” The Telegraph. April 18, 2017. Accessed May 12, 2019. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/18/senior-german-politicians-call-changes-dual-citizenship-laws/.  
 
17 Hofmann, Laura and Ingo Salmen. “Türken in Deutschland stimmen klar für Erdogans Plan.” Der 
Tagesspiegel. April 17, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2019. https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/referendum-tuerken-
in-deutschland-stimmen-klar-fuer-erdogans-plan/19676552.html. 
 






Der Spiegel went as far as to say that German integration had “failed.” 19 Members belonging 
to the far-right of the German political spectrum described the Turkish diaspora as a fifth 
column and demanded they return to Turkey.20 As stated, factions of the German media and 
politicians have stated that (failed) integration is the main reason for the voting behavior of 
German Turks. The purpose of this paper is to explore this apparent diagnosis. Before 
analyzing the claims of the media and prominent politicians, this paper will provide a brief 
overview of Turkish communities in Germany and the United States.  
 
The Turkish Diaspora of Germany 
 
 At the conclusion of the Second World War, Germany was largely destroyed by the 
ground and air campaigns of the allied forces. In addition to its weak infrastructure and 
economy, Germany’s labor force had also been devastated by six years of armed conflict. In 
response to this dilemma, Germany outsourced its labor in the form of several guest worker 
agreements throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Of the seven guest workers agreements enacted, 
Germany’s largest bilateral guest worker agreement was with the Republic of Turkey.21 
Signed in 1961, the deal prompted the large-scale of emigration of Turkish workers to West 
Germany.22 The majority of Turkish guest workers relocated to major urban and industrial 
centers.  
                                                 
19 Kazim, Hasnain “Opinion: The Bizarre Behavior of Turkish-German Voters.” SPIEGEL ONLINE. April 18, 
2017. Accessed May 17, 2019. https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/referendum-in-turkey-the-bizarre-
behavior-of-turkish-german-voters-a-1143735.html. 
 
20 Huggler, Justin. “Senior German Politicians Call for Changes to Dual Citizenship Laws after German Turks 
Vote to Increase Erdogan's Powers.” The Telegraph. April 18, 2017. Accessed May 02, 2018. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/18/senior-german-politicians-call-changes-dual-citizenship-laws/.   
 
21 Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos, and Karen Schönwälder. “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration 
Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germanys Guest Worker System.” German Politics and 
Society, vol. 24, no. 3, Jan. 2006, pp. 1–19., doi:10.3167/104503006780441629, 8.   
 
22 Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos, and Karen Schönwälder. “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration 
Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germanys Guest Worker System.” German Politics and 
Society, vol. 24, no. 3, Jan. 2006, pp. 1–19., doi:10.3167/104503006780441629, 8.   
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 Due to the nature of the labor needs of Germany, most Turkish immigrants – 
individual men – belonged to the lowest levels of the labor market. They were predominantly 
from rural areas spread across the country, not from major urban centers such as the capital, 
Ankara or the major intellectual hub, Istanbul. As the name guest worker (Gastarbeiter) 
implies, work contracts were originally meant for fixed – and short – periods of time. 
Contracts between individual laborers and their respective organizations were originally 
meant to last two years. At the end of the contract, workers would return to their respective 
country of origin. However, due to the high costs associated with processing, and most 
importantly, training workers, large German companies pressured the German government to 
allow workers to stay for longer periods of time.23 
 Due to the economic struggles of the early 1970s, all guest worker programs came to a 
close in 1973. But while the guest worker agreements concluded, Turkish workers – already 
in Germany – were not sent home by the German government. Labor shortages forced 
German companies to retain their workers.24 Also, in the years after 1973, immigration to 
Germany from Turkey failed to level off or decrease; instead, it increased exponentially due 
to family reunification policies implemented shortly thereafter. Richard Alba and Nancy 
Foner, in their book, Strangers No More, state, “however much western European countries 
may have wished to seal their borders, they did not entirely shut the door on these 
immigrations. Family reunification subsequently became – and remains – a dominant mode 
by which new immigrants from outside Europe gain entry. Indeed, the closing down of guest 
worker programs accelerated the process of family reunification, as many migrants decided 
                                                 
 
23 “Turkish Guest Workers Transformed German Society.” Deutsche Welle. October 30, 2011. Accessed June 
11, 2019. www.dw.com/en/turkish-guest-workers-transformed-german-society/a-15489210. 
 
24 Seifert, Wolfgang. “Migrations- und Integrationspolitik.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. May 31, 




against returning home. In Germany, for example, the number of Turkish citizens rose by 70 
percent in the decade following 1973.”25  
 In the 1980s, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) implemented a campaign to halt 
Turkish immigration into Germany and encourage Turks residing in Germany to return to 
Turkey. The efforts of the CDU hurt relations between the German state and Turkish 
populations, and ultimately proved ineffective. By 1978, 1.2 million Turkish nationals were 
registered in Germany; in 1980, there were 1.5 million; in 1998, there were 2.1 
million.26 Despite the growing numbers of Turks in Germany, due to Germany’s jus sanguinis 
citizenship law, it was very difficult for Turkish residents to obtain German citizenship from 
the 1960s to the 1990s. This changed in 2000, when the German citizenship law was changed 
to a jus soli system.27 However, despite this change, roughly half of the Turkish community in 
Germany still holds Turkish citizenship alone. Today, there are roughly 3 million people with 
Turkish roots living in Germany, making it the largest ethnic minority in the country.28 Of this 
figure, 1.4 million are Turkish citizens.29 In the years since the first guest workers arrived in 
Germany in the 1960s, the Turkish community has expanded into three distinct generations. 
Details of these generations will be covered in the analysis section of this work.   
 
 
                                                 
25 Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. Strangers no more: Immigration and the challenges of integration in North 
America and Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton U Press, 2017, 22.   
 
26 Luft, Stefan. “Die Anwerbung Türkischer Arbeitnehmer Und Ihre Folgen.” Bundeszentrale für Politische 
Bildung. August 4 2014. Accessed June 25, 2019. www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/tuerkei/184981/gastarbeit. 
 
27 “Becoming a German Citizen by Birth.” Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. September 




28 “German Turks Still Rooted in the East: Study.” Deutsche Welle. July 24, 2019. Accessed June 12, 2019. 
www.dw.com/en/german-turks-still-rooted-in-the-east-study/a-44799929. 
 





The Turkish Diaspora of the United States 
 
 As Germany’s Turkish diaspora has become the country’s largest minority 
community, the amount of information and studies regarding this group is high. In contrast, 
the amount of coverage of Turks in the United States is relatively low, given its small size. 
Nonetheless, there are a few Turkish academics who have provided works which detail 
Turkish immigration to the United States. The immigration of Turkish citizens to the US can 
be divided into three distinct periods.30 The first period is between 1820 and 1950.31 Over the 
course of this period, 362,000 immigrants entered the US from the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkey.32 The importance of this period is largely irrelevant to this specific work for two 
reasons. First, it is difficult to know exactly how many ethnic Turks entered the United States 
because the strong Turkish identity created and cultivated at the beginning of the Turkish 
Republic had not yet taken place.33 Second, in the years following 1925, immigration from 
Turkey to the United States decreased significantly and many Turkish immigrants returned to 
Turkey. This could be a result of the Great Depression, stricter US immigration laws and/or 
the newly founded Republic of Turkey.34 By 1940, the previous number of 362,000 Turks had 
                                                 
30 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 
 2006. 1-177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 32. 
 
31 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 33. 
 
32 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 37, from 2004 Yearbook 
of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
  
33 Kaya, Ilhan. “Identity across Generations: A Turkish American Case Study.” The Middle East Journal, vol. 
63, no. 4, 2009, pp. 617–632., doi:10.3751/63.4.15, 619. 
 
34 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 36, from Kaya, Ilhan. 
(2003). Shifting Turkish American Identity Formations in the United States. Unpublished PhD dissertation 




decreased to 104,000.35 The second wave of immigration, starting in the 1950s, is far more 
important for the purposes of this paper.  
 At the conclusion of World War II, the immigration of Turkish citizens to the United 
States resumed. This phase of Turkish immigration into the US can be clearly defined as the 
period between 1951 and 1980.36 Between 1951 and 1960, roughly 3,500 Turkish citizens 
entered the United States. Between 1961 and 1970, this figure rose to over 10,000. And in the 
next decade, between 1971 and 1980, this figure increased again to nearly 13,500.37 In 
contrast to the Turkish workers who entered Germany at this time, the Turkish immigrants in 
the United States were highly-skilled, well-educated professionals. Most Turkish immigrants 
who entered the United States between 1950 and 1980 were small- and medium-size business 
owners and members of the STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) and 
medical communities.38 The 1965 Immigration Act allowed for an increase in the number of 
specialists and professionals entering the United States from Turkey.39 In contrast to the first 
phase of Turkish immigration to the United States, the majority of Turkish immigrants in the 
second phase remained in the United States. Members of the second wave were also 
                                                 
35 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 38, from Ahmed, F. 
(1993). Turks in America: The Ottoman Turk's Immigrant Experience. Greenwich, Connecticut: Columbia 
International Press, 95.  
 
36 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 41. 
 
37 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 41, 2004 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
 
38 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 42. 
 
39 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-




nationalistic, and members of this community – similar to German Turks – created several 
Turkish-centric cultural organizations throughout the United States, such as the Federation of 
Turkish American Associations (FTAA) and the Turkish American Women's League 
(TAWL)40  
 The third phase of Turkish immigration to the United States represents a mixture of 
the first two phases of Turkish immigration. Specifically, the third phase of immigration to 
the United States included professionals, students and semi-skilled/unskilled workers. The 
latter demographic of this group is mainly the result of the US Diversity Immigration Visa 
Program.41 According to US immigration statistics, roughly 47,500 Turkish citizens entered 
the country between 1987 and 2004.42 Per year, immigration levels remained relatively 
consistent, ranging between one and three thousand. Like the Turks of Germany, it is difficult 
to determine the exact number of Turkish Americans in the United States today. According to 
the United States Census Bureau, individuals with Turkish descent reached over 200,000 in 
2011.43 The number of Turkish citizens in the United States is just over 100,000, a 
significantly smaller group in comparison to Turkish citizens in Germany.44 Due to the lack of 
sufficient contemporary studies on American Turks, it is difficult to determine the exact 
demographics of residents in the United States with Turkish citizenship. 
                                                 
40 Kaya, Ilhan. “Identity across Generations: A Turkish American Case Study.” The Middle East Journal, vol. 
63, no. 4, 2009, pp. 617–632., doi:10.3751/63.4.15, 619, Kaya, “Shifting Turkish American Identity Formations 
In The United States,” 211. 
 
41 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 46. 
 
42 Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings and policy 
recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-
177. http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006_sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf, 47, 2004 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
 
43 “American FactFinder - Results.” Data Access and Dissemination Systems (DADS). October 05, 2010. 















 German media organizations and politicians have identified integration as the main 
cause of the German-Turkish voting results in the 2017 Turkish Referendum – and 
subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections. This paper seeks to analyze this apparent 
connection through the use of tested voting behavior theories and a comparative analysis of 
German and American-Turkish integration in their respective societies. Before conducting 
this analysis, it is useful to understand the large academic field devoted to voting behavior. In 
the following section, the paper will provide a detailed overview of several schools of voting 
behavior theory.  
  The academic field devoted to voting behavior can be divided into several schools of 
thought. Per the C.J. Williams’ 21st Century Political Science Handbook on voting behavior, 
these fields can be divided into five major schools: sociological, media, rational, 
psychological and social capital.45 This overview will focus only on the first four schools 
listed. Voting behavior theory consists of two subfields or focuses, specifically voting choice 
and voting decision. Voting choice can be defined as the support that an individual forms for 
one particular candidate or party. Voting decision can be defined as the decision of an 
individual to participate in a vote.46  
 Historically, the “sociological theory of opinion formation” was the first major, 
comprehensive academic attempt at explaining voting behavior.47 As the name of this school 
                                                 
45 Williams, C. J. “Voting Behavior.” 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook: 813-21. 
doi:10.4135/9781412979351.n94, 813. 
 
46 Williams, C. J. “Voting Behavior.” 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook: 813-21. 
doi:10.4135/9781412979351.n94, 813. 
 




suggests, these theories focus on the impact of social conditions and membership on voting 
opinion and choice. Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, along with Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet 
published The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Election 
in 1944. These three academics conducted research through surveys in Eric County, Ohio 
leading up to the 1940 United States presidential election.48 Throughout the surveys, the 
effectiveness of personal connections and trust in both vote opinion and choice prevailed over 
the influence of mass communications.49  
 Ten years after the publication of The People’s Choice, Berelson, along with 
Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, published Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a 
Presidential Election. Just as The People’s Choice had covered the presidential election of 
1940, Berelson’s 1950 work covered the 1948 presidential election using a panel study in the 
mid-size, semi-industrial city of Elmira in New York state.50 Again, the purpose of the panel 
study was to test whether or not social conditions have an effect on voting behavior. In the 
end, the panel study provided results that supported this position. Berelson et al. found that 
individuals who identified with particular social groups are more likely to have their voting 
opinion and choice affected by such memberships and affiliations. Berelson et al. specifically 
identifies ethnic, religious, racial groups; close-knit family structures; and social classes as 
having the greatest effects on voting behavior. Furthermore, Berelson et al. found that 
geographic cleavages play a role in voting behavior as well.51 
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 Another major school of voting behavior theory is related to the media and its effect 
on opinion formation. Many academics belonging to this school form their analyses on the 
assumption that the majority of citizens are ill-informed in political affairs. This assumption 
might also be shared by those belonging to other schools as well. John Zaller’s 1992 book, 
The Nature in Origins of Mass Opinion, finds that individuals form their political opinions 
and ultimately decide on candidates/parties based on information they receive from pundits on 
political topics in the media.52 The more an individual is engaged in politics, the more they 
rely on the media for information. When individuals are asked to provide their political 
opinions, they simply provide information they have received from discourse among political 
experts.53 Of course, within the context of current elections, the role of social media has 
increased significantly. In many cases, the role of the media has prompted debates on national 
security which points to the effectiveness of the media on voting behavior. 
 Another major academic school of voting behavior theory is related to rational 
thought. In contrast to the sociological school, the rational school has experienced significant 
back-and-forth between experts. Anthony Downs’ 1957 work, “An Economic Theory of 
Political Action in a Democracy”, served as the first comprehensive piece devoted to rational 
theory and voting behavior.54 In essence, as most rational theories on any topic suggest, a 
cost-benefit analysis is used to understand the actions of individuals. Downs asserts that 
individuals place political candidates or parties on a political scale (from left to right), and 
systematically analyze these political them based on opinions and stances; ultimately, 
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individuals choose a candidate or party that best represents their own beliefs.55 
 Rosenstone and Hansen’s 1993 work “Mobilization, Participation and American 
Democracy” introduced group membership theory into the rational theory debate. In some 
ways, group membership theory has similar traits to the results of the studies conducted by 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet in 1940. Specifically, the studies conducted in Ohio found 
that the social groups to which individuals belonged played a significant role in influencing 
voting behavior. The idea of group membership theory is that individuals belonging to a 
group are pressured into forming political opinions and participating in voting by others. In 
addition to the sociological and rational elements of group membership theory, psychology 
also has a certain effect as well.  Specifically, the theory rests on the assumption that 
individuals feel good when they are accepted.56 In the context of voting, individuals vote as a 
result of the benefits of social acceptance by a larger group.  
 The last major school of voting behavior theory (covered in this work) is related to the 
effects of psychology on opinion formation and voting. The work of Donald T. Campbell et 
al. suggests that over time individuals form a certain identification with political parties or 
candidates. This connection and identification in turn guides their political opinions and 
voting patterns. In essence, when an individual identifies with a particular party, the 
psychological connection motivates that individual to vote for the party or a candidate 
representing that party.57 Campbell also found that the stronger a person’s connection with a 
political party, the more likely he or she is to participate in elections. Additionally, 
Campbell’s theory suggests that the more individuals care about the outcome of an election, 
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the more they will participate. This factor is in ways not dissimilar from traditional rational 
theory, in that a person participates in voting because he or she cares about the benefit gained 
as a result of an election or referendum. Other explanations from Campbell include political 
efficacy, specifically the idea that if an individual feels like the government is responsive to 
them, they will participate in voting; and civic duty, that somehow voting is ingrained into 
individuals, a natural action of citizens within a democracy.58 In addition to the works of 
Campbell, Mary R. Anderson, in her 2009 work, “Beyond Membership: A Sense of 
Community and Political Behavior” places an emphasis on community psychology on 
opinion formation and individual voting patterns. Specifically, she found, through survey 
studies, that a perceived strong – or weak – sense of belonging can influence voting 













                                                 
58 Williams, C. J. “Voting Behavior.” 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook: 813-21. 
doi:10.4135/9781412979351.n94, 818. 
 
59 Anderson, Mary R. “Beyond Membership: A Sense of Community and Political Behavior.” Political 










 German media and politicians have labeled integration, or failed integration 
specifically, as the main reason for the voting patterns of the German-Turkish population. 
However, the apparent failed integration of German Turks is not clearly defined by these 
bodies. It is a broad diagnosis of an incredibly nuanced topic. In the analysis phase of this 
work, I will focus on the sociological and psychological schools of voting behavior theory, as 
these two schools encompass many traditional elements or subfields of integration generally. I 
will take certain facets of each school – as detailed in the theoretical overview – and conduct 
a comparative analysis concentrating on the German and American cases. The goal of the 
analysis phase of this work is to provide – through a most different approach-comparative 
analysis – an explorative overview, not an explanatory one. By uncovering the major 
differences of the sociological and psychological elements of both American and German 
Turks, this paper will provide a foundation upon which future studies can be conducted.  
 
Sociological  
   
Class Structure 
 
  As detailed in the theoretical overview, Berelson’s 1954 work, Voting, found that 
individuals surveyed voted differently based on socioeconomic status. For example, he found 
that individuals belonging to the highest socioeconomic classes in the United States mainly 
 
 19 
voted for the Republican Party.60 In the case of Germany, as briefly covered in the 
background section, the first Turkish citizens to enter the country belonged to the lowest 
socioeconomic class. The first Turkish citizens in Germany took jobs in labor-intensive, 
typically low-paying industries such as mining, manufacturing and construction.61 However, 
after the economic failures of the early 1970s and the changing nature of the German 
economy, the value of the positions occupied by Turkish immigrants decreased dramatically. 
This development had negative consequences on the work opportunities for Turks in 
Germany, and thus, the ability for this group to accede to higher socioeconomic classes was 
weakened as well.   
 Generally, empirical research has shown that second-generation immigrants are more 
likely to accede to the middle class than first-generation immigrants. Germany’s second-
generation Turks, however, have not experienced widespread success in terms of achieving 
middle-class status, especially in comparison to other Turkish populations in Europe and the 
United States. Jörg Hartmann, of Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, conducted an analysis 
in 2016 on the employment of the children of guest workers (first-generation German Turks) 
to see if second-generation German Turks have acceded to the middle class. Through his 
research, he found that German Turks face the most severe disadvantages of all second-
generation Turks in Europe.62 Of the nearly three million large Turkish community in 
Germany, around 1.5 million belong to the second generation.63 Several reports suggest that 
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this portion of the community – which makes up the majority of the German-Turkish 
population – has the greatest difficulties in finding employment, earns less,64 has the lowest 
access to salaried positions and the greatest risk for unemployment.65  
 The Berlin Institute for Population and Development conducted an analysis in 2009 in 
order to determine the integration levels of immigrant populations in Germany. The study 
ranked immigrant communities according to several social aspects on a scale from 1.0 to 8.0 
(1.0 meaning failed integration and 8.0 meaning successful integration). The study found that 
while Turkish immigrants in Germany rank within the top 50% of immigrant groups in terms 
of financial stability (dependence on public benefits and individual earnings), they rank the 
lowest of any immigrant community – scoring a 1.7 out of 8.0 – in terms of gainful 
employment (statistics for unemployment, youth employment and self-employment; 
proportion of housewives; number of people working in public service and professional 
jobs).66  
 In contrast to the German case, the majority of Turkish immigrants who came to the 
United States between 1950 and 1980, belonged to the upper echelon of the socioeconomic 
structure. They belonged to elite circles in Turkey, and were thus afforded better educational 
and professional opportunities in the US. As detailed in the overview of the Turkish 
community in the United States, at the same time that the first unskilled and semi-skilled 
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Turkish guest workers entered Germany, mainly highly-skilled, and high-earning professional 
Turkish immigrants were entering the US. Mainly, the Turkish immigrants of the “second 
wave” were members of the STEM and medical communities – traditionally high-paying 
professions. In the 1970s, the decade in which the most Turkish immigrants migrated to the 
United States in the second wave (13,500), Turks in the US were highly-skilled professionals 
and individuals pursuing advanced degrees aimed at entering the work force at higher levels. 
On average, the Turkish community in the United States enjoys a higher level of professional 
occupation than US native born – a stark contrast to the Turks of Germany. Specifically, 
46.9% of the Turks in the United States are concentrated in professional occupations. This 
figure “placed Turks among those immigrants in the USA with the highest rates of 
professional specialty occupations in 2000.”67   
 It is worth noting that many members of the third wave of immigration to the United 
States have blue-collar jobs in major urban centers, mainly the New York City metropolitan 
area. As detailed in a New York City-based 2002 study conducted by Ilhan Kaya, one of the 
most prominent Turkish academics covering America’s Turkish diaspora, third wave 
immigrants are much like first-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany. Specifically, they 
rely on established Turkish communities to provide work – at mainly low levels – in the New 
York City area.68 However, in contrast to Germany, second-generation Turks in the United 
States have either remained or acceded to the middle and upper classes.69 Specifically, those 
second-generation American Turks belonging to affluent families retained this socioeconomic 
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status, and those belonging to lower class first-generation immigrants have moved up the 




 Often times, research and debate regarding the socioeconomic status of immigrant 
populations both in the United States and Germany eventually includes talks of education 
levels and training. Germany’s first-generation Turkish immigrants were recruited to work in 
Germany based on their ability to complete labor-intensive jobs, not their levels of education. 
The majority of the Turkish guest workers who entered Germany between 1961 and 1973 
were poorly educated. As a result of the anticipated short-term stays of Turkish guest workers, 
they were not afforded comprehensive German language courses. Instead, they “were taught 
German at the level at which they would be expected to carry out their respective tasks.”70 
The lack of access to sufficient re-training and language courses severely limited first-
generation German Turks in their ability to gain higher-wage employment and enter the 
middle class.  
 Many researchers find that the German state has failed to provide sufficient education 
to its Turkish minority community. Yasemin Karakasoglu, of Bremen University, states that 
in terms of education, “for 30 to 40 years, the Turks were not offered enough.”71 In the 
previously mentioned study conducted by Jörg Hartmann, he concluded that the inability of 
second-generation German Turks to accede to the middle class is rooted in education. He 
found that, in comparison to native Germans, second-generation German Turks have lower 
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chances of “receiving vocational training,72 have lower speaking and reading skills,73 lower 
transition rates to gymnasium, and lower chances of completing the Abitur,”74 the 
qualification needed to enroll in university. Hartmann concludes that the inability of second-
generation German Turks to accede to the middle class is related to insufficient educational 
qualifications and vocational training. He blames the “standardized” and “stratified” nature of 
the German education system.75 In the same 2009 minority integration study, the Berlin 
Institute for Population and Development found that Turkish immigrants rank the lowest in 
terms of education of any migrant community in Germany (indicators included percentage of 
uncompleted degrees, level of educational achievement, number of high school seniors and 
number of academics). On the same scale, from 1.0 to 8.0, Germany’s Turkish community 
ranked last with a score of 1.3.76  
 Similar to the differences between German and American Turks in terms of 
socioeconomic status, education levels among these two populations are starkly different as 
well. As stated in the background on Turks in the United States, the majority of highly-skilled 
professionals who entered in the second wave of immigration were highly educated. 
Furthermore, large portions of the second and third waves of immigration included students 
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pursuing higher degrees. Similar to the figures on professional occupations of Turkish 
immigrants, 42.7% of Turkish immigrants in the United States hold a university degree, 
which is on average higher than native-born American citizens.77  
 Members of the third wave of Turkish immigration to the United States have mixed 
educational backgrounds. Within this community, there are many Turkish immigrants who 
have low education levels and work blue-collar jobs. These individuals are largely 
concentrated in urban centers, which will be discussed in the next subsection. In contrast to 
the second-generation German Turks, who have had trouble acquiring higher levels of 
education, second-generation American Turks are well educated. 78 The differences in 
education levels for first-generation Turks in Germany and the United States is clear. Turkish 
immigrants belonging to this generation had largely different social upbringings in Turkey 
and entered separate countries at two distinctly different socioeconomic levels. The 
differences in the second generation are less clear. This could be a result of the nature of the 
stratified nature of the German education system as described by Hartmann’s study.79 Degrees 
from basic schools (Hauptschulen) in Germany fail to offer the qualifications needed in order 
to enroll in higher education and thus attain high-wage employment. As a result, the children 
of second-generation German Turks are placed into the same position.   
 Also, as mentioned in the background section on the first Turkish immigrants to 
Germany, the majority of the jobs maintained by this group were hands-on and labor-
intensive. Before 1973, 80% of foreign workers held employment in the manufacturing and 
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construction sectors, while 20% worked in the service sector.80 Before the 1970s, the German 
education system placed a heavy emphasis and value on the basic school diploma 
(Hauptschulabschluss), which provided young members of society with the qualification 
necessary to enter blue-collar employment. At one time, two-thirds of all German children 
attended this school form.81 However, as the value and availability of labor-intensive, manual 
jobs decreased, mainly in the 1970s,82 so did the value of the Hauptschulabschluss. This had 
an adverse effect on the children of Turkish guest workers who entered this school form based 
on the professions of their parents, poor German language skills, or a highly-debated school 
selection process at the primary school level which tends to disadvantage children with 




 Bernard Berelson’s 1954 work, Voting, also uncovered the significant impact of 
geographic cleavages on voting behavior. If an individual lives within a closed, tight-knit 
community, that same individual tends to vote in the way of the community. In the case of 
Germany, as a result of the jobs taken by Turkish guest workers, there was an especially large 
concentration of Turkish migrants in urban centers.84 Additionally, many guest workers were 
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provided housing in large dormitories by their respective employers.85 Wolfgang Seifert of 
the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, states that the concentration of foreigners in 
“densely populated areas was regulated in order to avoid social conflicts. This led to a 
discrimination of the foreign population in the housing market, because in particular they 
were denied access to cheap housing.”86 Rauf Ceylan, a social scientist who has been 
studying the ghettoization of Germany’s immigrant populations states that ethnocentric 
communities are important to new immigrants as they provide a “cushion from culture 
shock.”87 The cushion that Ceylan describes can be interpreted as a cushion from the 
alienation – as described by Karl Marx’s Theory of Alienation – that low-class workers 
experience in new, capitalistic societies.88 The effects of discrimination in the housing market 
and early formation of formally and informally segregated communities are still seen in 
Germany – and other major European cities – today, especially in regard to the Turkish 
community. Today, there are neighborhoods in every major German city which are labeled as 
“Turkish” neighborhoods. Such examples include Berlin’s Kreuzberg, Duisburg’s Marxloh, 
and Dortmund’s Nordstadt. The results of the 2017 Constitutional Referendum and 2018 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections show that German cities with larger concentrations 
of Turkish residents showed higher support for President Erdogan and the AKP. In the case of 
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the 2017 Referendum, the support for Erdogan in cities like Essen, Duisburg and Dortmund – 
cities in NRW – was the highest in the country.89   
 In the case of the United States, as detailed in the background sections, the first wave 
of Turkish workers in the United States mainly immigrated to large urban centers as well. 
However, it must be noted, that the majority of the first Turkish immigrants to the United 
States returned to Turkey in the 1930s and 1940s. The second wave of Turkish immigrants 
also moved to urban centers, but the socioeconomic status and educational opportunities 
pursued by Turkish immigrants suppressed the need to congregate in certain areas with 
cheaper housing. This status “provided an important degree of freedom of movement and 
opportunity.”90 While some cities in the United States have larger Turkish populations and 
Turkish-centric communities, they are not as prevalent as in Germany.  
 Interestingly, while support for President Erdogan and the AKP is among the lowest in 
the United States out of all major Turkish diasporas abroad, there is one area in which 
President Erdogan enjoys (relatively) higher support. While this may seem like a mere 
coincidence, geographic cleavages could offer a certain insight. The New York City 
metropolitan area has the largest Turkish-American concentration in the United States.91 
Paterson, New Jersey, a city with a Turkish population of around 20,000, has the largest 
concentration of residents with Turkish roots in the country.92 In addition to Patterson, New 
Jersey, Sunnyside in Queens, Brighton Beach in Brooklyn and the city of Clifton, New Jersey 
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are other large American-Turkish enclaves in this area.93 In all election since 2012, American-
Turkish support – while still low – has continually been the highest in the New York City 
metropolitan area. 
 American-Turkish immigrants belonging to lower socioeconomic classes, who have 
been immigrating to the United States since 1981, choose to live in the aforementioned 
enclaves for labor market considerations and the established Turkish communities in this 
area.94 While it difficult to determine the waves to which Turkish residents in the United 
States have Turkish citizenship, members of the third wave are more likely to have Turkish 
citizenship. When considering the education levels, types of jobs, and community 
considerations detailed by Berelson et. al., there are many similarities between the Turks in 
the New York City area and major urban centers in Germany. Indeed, one Turkish academic, 




Sense of Belonging  
 
 An important topic within the overall debate of integration is the “sense of belonging” 
that communities have towards their country of residence. In terms of the psychological 
school, Mary Anderson’s work related to this topic found that an individual’s perception of 
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his or her significance to a group impacts the way in which he or she votes.96 In a way, it is 
similar to the basis of Rosenstone and Hansen’s group membership theory. As mentioned in 
the background on Germany’s Turks, contradictory immigration policies of the 1980s, 
unfavorable citizenship laws and naturalization policies, and educational and labor market 
shortcomings, have obstructed the ability and desire of the Turkish community to establish a 
strong affiliation with the German state and society. In recent years, a number of NRW-based 
institutions have conducted studies on this topic.  
 In 2016, the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster conducted a study covering 
all three distinct German-Turkish generations and recent Turkish immigrants to Germany. 
While 90% of those surveyed indicated that they enjoyed living in Germany, over 50% 
asserted that they do not feel “socially recognized.”97 Specifically, 51% of respondents 
indicated that as individuals with Turkish backgrounds, they feel like second class citizens.  
Furthermore, 54% agreed strongly with the statement that “no matter how much I apply 
myself, I will never be recognized as a part of German society.”98 The Essen-based Center for 
Turkish Studies and Integration Research (ZfTI), conducted a study in 2018 on the 
identification and political participation of Turkish immigrants in NRW. In relation to the 
“events which took place in 2016”99 (which have been mentioned in this work), participants 
were asked whether their relationship to Germany and Turkey had strengthened, remained the 
same, or weakened. While the majority of those surveyed stated that their belonging remained 
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unchanged, significantly more participants indicated that their relationship to Turkey grew 
stronger and their relationship to Germany grew weaker.100 Of course, it is important to 
consider the timing of this survey, specifically in relation to the referendum results in April of 
the next year. In June 2018, the Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Duisburg-
Essen, published a study which identified further shortcomings in the German-Turkish sense 
of belonging in Germany. The results showed that Turks in Germany feel a stronger 
connection to Turkey than Germany. Specifically, nearly 89% feel they belong “strongly” or 
“very strongly” to Turkey, compared to 81% to Germany.101 In terms of politics, the same 
study found 19.6% of Turkish residents were strongly interested in German politics, while 
47% had little interest at all. More respondents were strongly interest in Turkish politics 
(33%).102  
 Unfortunately, the amount of surveys on this topic in the American case are severely 
limited. Similar to the aforementioned surveys in Germany, Kaya’s 2002 work uncovered 
feelings that American Turks – of the first and second generations mainly – have of Turkey 
and the United States. His findings showed several differences between German and 
American Turks, mainly in relation to the second generation. In contrast to second-generation 
German Turks, Kaya finds that second-generation American Turks recognize their Turkish 
heritage, but identify mainly as American. As previously mentioned, due to the education 
levels and professional attainment of members of this generation, members of this 
demographic are better integrated into American society. Kaya states that of the eight second-
generation Turkish Americans surveyed, all eight “asserted their American identities and 
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acknowledged their Turkish backgrounds […].”103 Kaya also states that members of the 
second-generation are on a path towards “americanization”,104 as “their families do not limit 
their acculturation, as their peers at school and the media also contribute to their socialization. 
They speak perfect English, many of their friends are ‘Americans,’ and they know American 
culture much better than their parents do.”105   
 Another important distinction between the American and German-Turkish “senses of 
belonging” is potentially related to the ethnic foundations upon which the two countries have 
traditionally been based. While the United States is a country without a specific common 
ancestry, Germany has traditionally been classified as a nation-state – a country whose 
membership is based on a relatively homogenous ethnic identity.106 While the German case 
has experienced change since the new citizenship law in 2000, traditionally, German  
citizenship and its associated “sense of belonging” was associated with German ethnicity 
specifically. With this in mind, American Turks – and other immigrant communities – have 




 While not a specifically mentioned topic within the psychological school of voting 
behavior theory, citizenship has also found its way into the debate on integration – or rather, 
the ability to gain citizenship and the societal benefits that accompany it. In the aftermath of 
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the referendum vote, German politicians belonging mainly to the right of the political 
spectrum, pushed for the complete removal of dual citizenship.107 By making this claim and 
pushing for this policy change, these politicians have established a connection between 
citizenship and voting behavior.  
 The citizenship discussion is not related to the practical or legal consequences of 
easier attainment of German citizenship for Turkish residents. Rather, the focus of the 
citizenship debate is psychological in nature, related more to a feeling of acceptance to 
Germany. If Germany had made the process simpler for Turkish residents to gain German 
citizenship, there lies an assumption that Turkish citizens in Germany would vote differently. 
More specifically, friendlier citizenship laws would give German Turks an increased sense of 
belonging, which would take away the talking points that President Erdogan has used to 
bolster support from this group in the past.  
 Despite these assumptions, however, most research suggests that the voting behavior 
of Turkish citizens would not change despite friendlier German citizenship policies. If one 
compares – the very different – German and US citizenship laws and the voting behaviors of 
their respective Turkish populations, there appears to be a connection. This, however, is not 
necessarily the case. It is made clear in the case of Turks in the Netherlands. In contrast to 
Germany, which made it very difficult for non-ethnic Germans to gain citizenship until 2000, 
the Netherlands has traditionally made the process relatively simple for its Turkish 
community to become Dutch citizens – at least until the late 1990s.108 The results of this 
policy have not generated different voting results of the Dutch-Turkish population, however. 
In fact, While the Turkish population in the Netherlands is significantly smaller than in 
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Germany, support for Erdogan and the AKP is higher per capita.109 Additionally, the same 
2016 study conducted by the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, found that 
citizenship is not a pressing issue in the Turkish community. In fact, out of the six questions 
asked on “prerequisites for good integration”,110 German citizenship was the least important. 
Also, in the survey conducted by Kaya in the early 2000s, several individuals surveyed with 
only Turkish citizenship, also mentioned that the attainment of US citizenship was not a 
priority.111 The ability to gain citizenship is considered by most academic literature to be an 
important step for the integration of minority communities, and German media organizations 
and politicians have mentioned this issue within the context of integration and German-
Turkish voting behavior. Despite this, however, within the context of voting behavior, the 
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 As relations between the West and Turkey have worsened in recent years, the voting 
behavior of eligible German Turks has naturally spawned backlash from German media 
organizations and lawmakers. The diagnosis of these two actors in this regard, specifically 
that failed integration is the cause of German-Turkish voting patterns, forms the basis upon 
which this work has been conceived. The fact that significant numbers of Germany’s largest 
minority community live in a liberal democratic state, and yet simultaneously support a 
despotic authoritarian regime is alarming, and worthy of understanding. The ability of the 
Erdogan administration to profit from the aforementioned campaign tactics in Germany 
signals certain weaknesses in relations between the Turkish community and German society. 
As observed in the comparative analysis section of this work, integrational weaknesses and 
shortcomings in the German case have been made clear. However, the ability to connect the 
integrational weaknesses in the German case and the integrational successes in the American 
case to the voting patterns of these two communities is very difficult. This paper, however, 
does not seek to establish proof or causation. It is an explorative work that seeks to offer 
foundations upon which further research can be conducted.  
 Although this work considered elements of the sociological and psychological schools 
of voting behavior theory, alternative avenues through which to conduct this comparative 
analysis are numerous. A major barrier, however, to conducting a comparative analysis using 
the two selected cases is the amount of information available – mainly in the American case. 
For example, other sociological considerations such as the role of religion and family 
structure could provide potential avenues for future research. Additionally, the role of the 
media on opinion formation also has potential explanatory elements, especially in the German 
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case. For example, German election researcher, Joachim Schulte, places an emphasis on the 
role of the Turkish media on German-Turkish voting patterns. Specifically, he asserts that 
those who voted for Erdogan have closer connections with Turkey, and therefore, mainly use 
media sources from Turkey as well.112 When considering that the majority of Turkish media 
sources are largely controlled by the Turkish state, a connection can be drawn to the voting 
patterns of this group. 
 In the end, while it is difficult to prove a concrete connection between integration and 
voting behavior, as done so by several German media organizations and politicians, through 
the comparative analysis, this work has uncovered two findings of potential significance. 
Specifically, this paper finds that (1) many of the sociological considerations, while varied, 
are rooted in education levels and opportunities and (2) the geographic cleavages have 
appeared to – in both the German and American cases – weaken the sense of belonging felt 
towards the host country and strengthen ethnic identity and pride, therein potentially affecting 
voting behavior.  
 In terms of education specifically, this work finds that education is the root cause of 
most of the sociological and psychological considerations provided in this study. For 
example, as concluded by the Hartmann study, the labor market challenges for German Turks 
is related to educational shortcomings and the nature of the German education system. As 
stated, education is the foundation upon which high-wage jobs and higher social class 
attainment is achieved. The formation of the geographic cleavages and the ensuing sense of 
belonging and identity issues can be linked to education. Higher levels of education for 
American Turks provided freedom of movement, as they were not bound to a specific area or 
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company sponsor. Lower levels of education for German Turks led to informal and formal 
segregation as a result of industry needs and social precautions. The lack of German language 
skills forced Turkish immigrants to establishment communities as a support system. To make 
things clear, education is not the root cause of German-Turkish voting behavior specifically, 
but it has led to various issues that – altogether – could influence opinion formation and 
voting patterns of this group. 
 In terms of geographic cleavages, in the past several Turkish elections and the 2017 
Referendum, President Erdogan and the AKP has received the greatest support in cities with 
the highest concentration of Turkish immigrants. In the June 2018 Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections, President Erdogan and the AKP won in every major city in Germany. 
The highest support, however, came from cities in the NRW region, which is home to the 
highest numbers of Turks in the country. This observation is strengthened by the American 
case. While the CHP still performs higher than the AKP, support for Erdogan is consistently 
the highest in the New York City metropolitan area, the area of the United States with the 
largest concentration of American Turks. As mentioned in the analysis phase, the third-wave 
Turkish immigrants who have immigrated to this area live in Turkish-centric boroughs similar 
to the Turkish neighborhoods of major German cities. As the works of Berelson et al. and 
Mary Anderson have determined, geographic cleavages and sense of belonging affect voting 
patterns of individuals in close-knit communities. As the several NRW-studies and Kaya’s 
2002 study have showed, individuals living in these communities lack a strong sense of 
belonging to their respective countries of residence and develop stronger ethnic identities.113 
To this end, the sociological and psychological effects of isolated ethno-centric geographic 
centers on ethnic identity and pride have potential effects on the voting patterns of German 
and American Turks.  
                                                 
113 Kaya, Ilhan. “Identity across Generations: A Turkish American Case Study.” The Middle East Journal, vol. 





“2017 Constitutional Referendum Results.” Yeni Şafak. April 2017. Accessed June 23, 2019.  
  https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-referandum-2017/secim-sonuclari. 
 
“2017 Constitutional Referendum Results: Germany.” Yeni Şafak. April 17, 2017. Accessed 
 June 9, 2019. https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-referandum-2017/yurtdisi-
 almanya-secim-sonuclari-referandum. 
 
“2017 Constitutional Referendum Results: U.S.” Yeni Şafak. April 17, 2017. Accessed June 
 23, 2019. https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-referandum-2017/yurtdisi-amerika-
 birlesik-dev-secim-sonuclari-referandum. 
 
Avcı, Gamze. “Comparing Integration Policies and Outcomes: Turks in the Netherlands and 
 Germany.” Turkish Studies, 7:1, 67-84, 2006 DOI: 10.1080/14683840500520592. 
 
Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. Strangers no more: Immigration and the challenges of 
 integration in North America and Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton U Press, 
 2017.   
 
Akcapar, Sebnem Koser. “Turkish Associations in the United States: Towards Building a 
 Transnational Identity.” Turkish Studies10, no. 2 (2009): 165-93. 
 doi:10.1080/14683840902863996. 
 
Akçapar, Şebnem Köşer. “Turkish highly skilled migration to the United States: New findings 
 and policy recommendations.” Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration 
 and Immigration in Turkey. 2006. 1-177. 
 http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~mirekoc/reports/2005_2006 sebnem_koser_akcapar.pdf. 
 
Akinci, Ugur, “Germanification Of Turkish-Americans,” Turkish Torque (2002), http:// 
 Gencturkler2.8m.Com/IMMIGRANTS/Turkish_Torque.Html. 
 
“American FactFinder - Results.” Data Access and Dissemination Systems (DADS). October 




Anderson, Mary R. “Beyond Membership: A Sense of Community and Political Behavior.” 





Ayçiçegi-Dinn, Ayse, and Catherine L. Caldwell-Harris. “Individualism–Collectivism among  
 Americans, Turks and Turkish Immigrants to the U.S.” International Journal of 
 Intercultural Relations, vol. 35, no. 1, 2011, pp. 9–16., 
 doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2010.11.006. 
 
“Becoming a German Citizen by Birth.” Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and 




Berelson, Bernard, Lazarsfeld, Paul Felix, and William N. McPhee. 1954. Voting: A study of 
 opinion formation in a presidential campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Byron, Chris. "Essence and Alienation: Marx’s Theory of Human Nature." Science & Society 
 80, no. 3 (2016): 375-94. doi:10.1521/siso.2016.80.3.375. 
 
Chambers, Madeline. "Pro-Erdogan Vote among Turks in Germany Unleashes Integration 




Dieler, Anna, Müller, Olaf, Pollack, Detlef, and Rosta Gergely. “Integration and Religion as 
 seen by People of Turkish Origin in Germany.” WWU Münster. June 16, 2016. 
 Accessed June 14, 2019. www.uni-muenster.de. 
 
Elger, Katrin, Ansbert Kneip, Merlind Theile, Katrin Elger, Ansbert Kneip, and Merlind 
 Theile. “Immigration: Survey Shows Alarming Lack of Integration in Germany.” 
 SPIEGEL ONLINE. January 26, 2009. Accessed May 19, 2019. 
 https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/grossbild-603588-1416723.html. 
 
Erdem, Kasım and Mehmet Solak. “Grand National Assembly of Turkey.” December 2012. 
 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/yayinlar/yabanci_diller/TBMM_Ingilizce.pdf, 6. 
 
Friedrichs, Julia. “Dreigliedriges Schulsystem: Uns Braucht Keiner.” Zeit. August 25, 2011. 
 Accessed June 25, 2019. www.zeit.de/2011/35/Hauptschueler. 
 
“German Turks Still Rooted in the East: Study.” Deutsche Welle. July 24, 2019. Accessed 





Grasmuck, Sherri, and Annika Marlen Hinze. “Transnational Heritage Migrants in Istanbul: 
 Second-generation Turk-American and Turk-German ‘Returnees’ in Their Parents’ 
 Homeland.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies42, no. 12 (2016): 1959-976. 
 doi:10.1080/1369183x.2016.1142365. 
 
Hartmann, Jörg. “Do Second-generation Turkish Migrants in Germany Assimilate into the 
 Middle Class?” Ethnicities 16, no. 3 (2016): 368-92. doi:10.1177/1468796814548234. 
 
Hartwich, Inna. “Warum Sie Ganz Unten Bleiben.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. January 8, 2017. 
 Accessed June 25, 2019. www.nzz.ch/international/probleme-der-integration-von-
 immigranten-warum-es-tuerken-in-deutschland-so-schwer-haben-ld.138334. 
 
Hill, Jenny. “Turkey Election: Expats Play Decisive Role in Erdogan Vote.” BBC News. June 
 21, 2018. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44546035. 
 
Hofmann, Laura and Ingo Salmen. “Türken in Deutschland stimmen klar für Erdogans Plan.” 




Huggler, Justin. “Senior German Politicians Call for Changes to Dual Citizenship Laws after 
 German Turks Vote to Increase Erdogan's Powers.” The Telegraph. April 18, 2017. 




“Identifikation und politische Partizipation türkeistämmiger Zugewanderter in Nordrhein-
 Westfalen und in Deutschland.” Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und 
 Integrationsforschung. February 2018. https://cdn.website-
 editor.net/09fe2713f5da44ff99ead273b339f17d/files/uploaded/2017.pdf. 
 
“June 2015 General Election Results.” Yeni Şafak. June 2015. Accessed April 17, 2019. 
 https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-2015/secim-sonuclari. 
 
Kaya, Ilhan. “Identity across Generations: A Turkish American Case Study.” The Middle East 
 Journal, vol. 63, no. 4, 2009, pp. 617–632., doi:10.3751/63.4.15. 
 
Kaya, Ilhan. “Identity And Space: The Case Of Turkish Americans*.” Geographical Review, 
 vol. 95, no. 3, 2010, pp. 425–440., doi:10.1111/j.1931-0846.2005.tb00374.x. 
 
Kazim, Hasnain “Opinion: The Bizarre Behavior of Turkish-German Voters.” SPIEGEL 






Klimek, Peter, Jimenez, Raul, Hidalgo, Manuel, Hinteregger, Abraham and Stefan Thurner. 
 “Election forensic analysis of the Turkish Constitutional Referendum 2017.” July 4, 
 2017. https://arxiv-org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/pdf/1706.09839.pdf. 
 
Mcfadden, Susan Willis. “German Citizenship Law and the Turkish Diaspora.” German Law 
 Journal, vol. 20, no. 1, 2019, pp. 72–88., doi:10.1017/glj.2019.7. 
 
“November 2015 General Election Results.” Yeni Şafak. November 2015. Accessed April 17, 
 2019. https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-2015-kasim/secim-sonuclari. 
 
Lazarsfeld, Paul Felix, Berelson, Bernard, and Hazel Gaudet. 1944. The people's choice: How 
 the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign. New York: Duell, Sloan & 
 Pearce. 
 
Luft, Stefan. “Die Anwerbung Türkischer Arbeitnehmer Und Ihre Folgen.” Bundeszentrale 
 für Politische Bildung. August 4 2014. Accessed June 25, 2019. 
 www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/tuerkei/184981/gastarbeit. 
  
“Nation-state.” Merriam-Webster. Accessed June 25, 2019. https://www.merriam-
 webster.com/dictionary/nation-state. 
 
Popp, Maximilian, Christoph Scheuermann, Maximilian Popp, and Christoph Scheuermann. 
 “At Home in a Foreign Country: German Turks Struggle to Find Their Identity.” 




“Presidential Elections Netherlands General Results” Yeni Şafak. June 2018. Accessed June 
 15, 2019. https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-cumhurbaskanligi-2018/yurtdisi-
 hollanda-secim-sonuclari.” 
 
Samsung, Tai, Renatus Isenberg, Enrico Caruso, Karl-Heinz Pflugmacher, Thomas Behrends, 
 Novi Prinz, Leo Löwenstein, and Heinz Keizer. “Türkische Gemeinde: „Ja" Aus 







Seifert, Wolfgang. “Migrations- und Integrationspolitik.” Bundeszentrale für politische  
 Bildung. May 31, 2012. Accessed April 26, 2019. www.bpb.de. 
 
Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos, and Karen Schönwälder. “How the Federal Republic Became 
 an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germanys Guest 
 Worker System.” German Politics and Society, vol. 24, no. 3, Jan. 2006, pp. 1–19., 
 doi:10.3167/104503006780441629, 8.   
 
“Turkey's Cavusoglu Accuses Germany of 'systematic Antagonism'.” Deutsche Welle. March 
 7, 2017. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-cavusoglu-
 accuses-germany-of-systematic-antagonism/a-37841018. 
 
“Turkey's Coup Attempt: What You Need to Know.” BBC News. July 17, 2016. Accessed 
 April 17, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36816045. 
 
“Turkey's Erdogan Makes Nazi Jibe over Germany Rally Ban.” BBC News. March 5, 2017. 
 www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39173296. 
 
“Turkish Guest Workers Transformed German Society.” Deutsche Welle. October 30, 2011. 
 Accessed June 11, 2019. www.dw.com/en/turkish-guest-workers-transformed-
 german-society/a-15489210. 
 
“U.S. Election Results - 24 June 2018 General Election.” Yeni Şafak. June 2018. Accessed 
 April 17, 2019. https://www.yenisafak.com/en/secim-2015/secim-sonuclari. 
 
“Why Many Turks in Germany Voted 'yes' in Erdogan's Referendum.” Deutsche Welle. April 
 18, 2017. Accessed June 11, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/why-many-turks-in-
 germany-voted-yes-in-erdogans-referendum/a-38472130. 
 
Williams, C. J. “Voting Behavior.” 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook: 
 813-21. doi:10.4135/9781412979351.n94. 
 
Wintour, Patrick. “Erdoğan Stakes All on Winning Referendum as Diplomatic Row 
 Simmers.” The Guardian. March 14, 2017. Accessed April 22, 2019. 
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/erdogan-turkey-referendum-
 diplomatic-row. 
 
